

# The President's Daily Brief

July 15, 1975

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## FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

#### CHINA-THAILAND

| Chinese leaders put unprecedented emphasis on the compatibility of China's Southeast Asian policies with the interests of countries in the region.  | 25X1<br>25X1 |
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| played down the importance of Thailand's  | 25X1<br>25X1 |
| communist party. Using his own fight against the Kuomintang as an example, Mao advised in dealing with the communist insurgency in Thailand, the most important step was to negotiate with insurgents while the government was still the stronger party. Mao cautioned that the government should revert to military suppression only if negotiations fail. He also warned that the insurgents would only become stronger if government soldiers were sent out to harass and kill them. He suggested that this had happened to the non-communist governments in South Vietnam and Cambodia. | 25X1         |
|   | 25X1<br>25X1 |
| Moscow would probably use its assistance to the North Vietnamese to "make demands" on Hanoi, such as the establishment of Soviet bases in Vietnam and transit rights for Soviet personnel and equipment. The implication was clearly that the Soviets would try to use Vietnam as a staging ground for expanding its influence in the region.   | 25X1         |
| Peking would attempt to persuade Hanoi not to assist the Soviets, but asserted that, if efforts were unsuccessful and the North Vietnamese attacked Thailand, China would come to Bangkok's assistance.   | 25X1<br>25X1 |
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|   | 25X1          |
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| Peking attaches great importance to improved relations with Bangkok. Although they certainly have not ruled out continuing their low-level support to Thailand's insurgents in the future, the Chinese currently are more concerned with winning allies for their anti-Soviet campaign. | 25X1          |
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| Mao  | 25X1<br>25X1 |
| foreign leaders who had become his "friends" President Nixon, Prime Minister Tanaka, and Emperor Haile Selassie"very quickly had great problems." The Chairman also showed considerable sensitivity on the subject of how he was treated, noting rather petulantly that the leaders of the Thai Communist Party had never visited him. This concern about being ignored was also evident in material that surfaced during the Cultural Revolution. | 25X1         |
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CHINA-IRAN

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### FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

#### NOTES

The Laotians agreed yesterday to return the USIS warehouse in Vientiane to US control.

The return of the warehouse closely follows the arrival in Vientiane of hard-line replacements for the three relatively moderate communist ministers recently placed on sick leave. The most important of the new officials, acting deputy prime minister and foreign minister Phoune Sipraseuth, slipped into Vientiane with little fanfare last week. Soon after his arrival the foreign ministry officially communicated the government's desire to begin new aid negotiations with the US. A number of thornier issues remain. Demonstrators and police still occupy two US compounds in the capital and Lao officials are still refusing to return property seized by demonstrators.

\* \*

Cambodian border defense forces killed over 100 civilians on July 5, according to a Cambodian intercept, as they attempted to escape from northern Battambang Province across the Thai border.

Many of those trying to flee apparently were of Thai, Lao, and Chinese extraction. Thai border officials have now been ordered to prevent Thai border residents from entering Cambodia to bring out relatives.

\*

The Indian Supreme Court has set August 11 to begin hearing oral arguments on Prime Minister Gandhi's appeal. The court's decision probably will not be reached until late summer or early fall.

Even if the court rules against Mrs. Gandhi, she may well remain in office. She could, for instance, have the election commissioner, whom she appointed, lift the penalty attached to her conviction, which calls for her exclusion from public office for six years. Media coverage on both the parliamentary session and the court case are proscribed. The government has tightened censorship regulations, and there appears to be increasing likelihood that several more foreign correspondents will be expelled.

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#### FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Conferees at the European security conference yesterday agreed on July 30 as the opening date for a summit at Helsinki.

During yesterday's session, final agreement was also reached on language concerning follow-on procedures for the conference and a clause protecting Allied rights in Berlin and Germany. Negotiations--primarily concerning confidence-building measures--will probably continue for several days, even though today has been set as the deadline for resolving all issues.

Heavy fighting resumed in Angola yesterday between the two major insurgency groups. Portugal's concern over the deteriorating situation was reflected by the sudden departure of Foreign Minister Melo Antunes for Luanda on Sunday.

The prestige of Portugal's military government rests heavily on the success of its decolonization policy. It also wants an end to the violence in order to stem the growing tide of Portuguese refugees. Antunes, a key moderate, said that Lisbon had "reached its limit" in efforts to bring peace to Angola and might now seek intervention by some international body.